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Abstract: 
 
In recent years various studies have examined the factors that may explain academic 
patents. Existing analyses have also underlined the substantial differences to be found in 
European countries in the institutional framework that defines property rights for 
academic patents. The objective of this study is to contribute to the empirical literature 
on the factors explaining academic patents and to determine whether the incentives that 
universities offer researchers contribute towards explaining the differences in academic 
patenting activity. The results of the econometric analysis for the Spanish universities 
point towards the conclusion that the principal factor determining the patents is funding 
of R&D while royalty incentives to researchers do not appear to be significant. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Universities, as it is widely recognised, are increasing their contribution to commercial 
technology development (Etzkowitz et al., 2003). There is also significant evidence of 
growth in university patenting (Henderson et al., 1993; Geuna and Nesta, 2006; 
Zeebrooeck et al., 2008), although this phenomenon is not homogeneous across 
universities. In recent years university patents have generated growing interest both on 
the part of academic researchers as well as from the point of view of policies designed 
to encourage innovation (Baldini, 2006; Baldini et al., 2006; Verspagen, 2006; Breschi 
et al., 2007). However, there are few empirical studies that analyze the university-patent 
relationship and the factors that affect academic patenting, particularly for European 
countries and universities. Therefore, as Azagra et al. (2006) point out, little is known 
about the mechanisms which favour university patenting, particularly at the micro level. 
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature that analyses the 
determinants of academic patenting. In comparison with previous studies (Coupé, 2003; 
Payne and Siow, 2003; Azagra et al., 2006) that focus their analyses mainly on the 
influence of R&D expenditures and Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) on academic 
patents, the purpose here is to examine the influence of incentives for university 
researchers to generate patents. As Lach and Schankerman (2008) have recently shown 
the universities in the United States that provide stronger royalty incentives to faculty 
scientists generate greater license incomes. 
 
The influence of the institutional framework on the generation of university patents has 
been the object of growing interest since the changes introduced by the Bayh-Dole Act, 
which gave universities the property rights to university patents derived from research 
financed with federal funds. In European countries there are substantial differences in 
the systems of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) governing research activities and 
patents in universities. While in some countries university researchers are the owners of 
patents derived from their research activities, in others the university retains the 
ownership although generally the researcher has the right to a share of the possible 
profits derived from the exploitation of the patent (Baldini et al., 2006; Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006; Verspagen, 2006). In addition, in order to create the right economic 
incentives for individual scientists to undertake more “patentable” research, some 
European countries, such as Germany and Italy, have changed the IPR system 
governing university researchers’ inventions (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Breschi et al., 
2007). However the legislative changes in these to countries have gone in opposite 
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directions. While in Germany the so-called “professor’s privilege”, through which 
university teachers retained all the property rights derived from their inventions, has 
been abolished, in Italy the “professor’s privilege” has been introduced so that the IPR 
on public employees’ inventions are now granted to the employees themselves although 
the universities have the right to receive a percentage of the net revenues that the 
commercial exploitation of the patented inventions generates (Baldini et al., 2006; 
Breschi et al., 2007). As Jaffe et al. (2007) point out the investigation of the role of 
policy levers such as the patent system or rules governing university licensing on the 
use of research with both scientific and commercial applications is an important 
research agenda that is in progress. 
 
The IPR system for university researchers’ inventions and the rules for the sharing 
between universities and their scientists of the revenues generated by inventions deserve 
particular consideration in the analysis of the determinants of academic patents. Some 
authors have emphasized the importance of incentives for the efforts of scientists in the 
development of inventions (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby et al., 2007), for the 
results of technology transfer centres (Siegel, 2003) and in some analyses some 
evidence has been found for this importance for academic patents (Coupé, 2003) and for 
university license incomes (Lach and Shankerman, 2008). However there is still little 
known about the influence that incentives have on researchers to generate patentable 
research. In Spain, although the universities are the owners of the inventions generated 
by university researchers, the latter have the right to a share of the royalties derived 
from their patented discoveries. This distribution of profits is established by each 
university through an internal regulation, which has given rise to significant differences 
among universities in the percentage of royalties assigned to universities and scientists.  
 
Therefore, in order to analyse the determinants of academic patenting at an institutional 
level, a data-base has been constructed for Spanish universities which includes the 
variables used commonly in the empirical analyses, but complements these with a 
variable on researchers’ incentives to patent. This has been done by compiling the 
information on the royalties assigned to scientists in each of the Spanish universities. 
The analysis of a specific country provides homogeneity in the institutional context in 
which universities carry out their activities as the legal and financial framework is an 
important factor explaining national differences in university patenting (Pavitt, 1998; 
Azagra et al., 2006; Verspagen, 2006). 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Firstly, the model is specified and the 
variables and data are described, including references to the empirical literature and 
results on the determinants of academic patenting. Secondly, the determinants of 
university patenting are explored through an applied analysis. Finally, the conclusions 
obtained and some policy implications are presented.  
 
 
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
 
In the same way as in the analysis of firm patenting, the theoretical framework used to 
analyse the determinants of academic patenting is the knowledge production function 
proposed by Griliches (1990). In this model the number of patents depends on the effort 
in R&D. This basic model has been extended with a set of other variables that may 
affect university patents. According to Henderson et al. (1998), three factors may 
explain the growth in the number of university patent applications that has been seen in 
the United States. These factors are changes in the law, the industry funding of 
university research and the increase in organised university technology offices. The last 
two factors have been included in the model in order to analyse the determinants that 
explain differences in university patenting while the first one has not been included 
because there have been no changes in the patent law since 1986. 
 
Various indicators for the quality and for the orientation of research in universities have 
also been included. Furthermore, incentives for researchers to patent should also be an 
explanatory variable for differences in academic patenting. 
 
Therefore the model using universities (i) as the unit of analysis is: 
 
PATi = f (R&Di, TTOi, Qi, Si, Ii)       (1) 
 
where PATi is the number of university-owned patent applications, R&Di is the 
university funding from all sources devoted to R&D activities, TTOi is an indicator of 
technology transfer offices, Qi measures the scientific quality of the universities, Si 
captures research orientation and Ii measures the incentives for researchers to patent. 
 
A data-base using different sources was constructed to carry out the estimations. This 
data-base includes information for all 47 public universities. Although there are 
currently 71 universities in Spain, the information for private universities is very scarce 
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and it has not been possible to include them in the analysis. It should also be pointed out 
that academic research in Spain is basically carried out by the public universities which 
cover 92.7% of the total university expenditure on R&D and employ 93.6% of all 
university researchers measured in full-time equivalent (INE, 2006).  
 
Patent data per university were obtained from the Spanish Office of Patents and Marks 
(OEPM) and from the European Patent Office (EPO). The analysis is focused on the 
available data on university-owned patents with the objective of examining the 
influence of the distribution of incentives between the universities and their researchers. 
This approach underestimates university involvement in patenting because it does not 
take into account the non-university owned patents that have a university inventor 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006, Verspagen, 2006). Nevertheless, a recent survey of six 
European countries, the Patval survey, shows that in Spain the fraction of university-
owned patents is larger than the proportion of non-university owned patents, but where 
a university inventor is involved (Verspagen, 2006), which differs from the results of 
the other European countries analysed. Furthermore, in Spain, the two types of patents 
are covered by the same regulation with regard to the distribution of royalties between 
the researchers and universities. An agreement is required between the firm and the 
University for a university inventor to receive royalties for his or her participation in a 
firm patent. After this agreement the distribution of royalties between the University 
and the researcher follow the same rules as those for a university-owned patent. 
 
As is common in analyses using patents as an indicator of innovation, we use 
applications for patents, specifically applications for national patents for the years 2002, 
2003 and 2004. To check the robustness of the results, applications for European patents 
have also been used although these are much less frequent than applications for national 
patents. Although university patent applications in Spain are, in comparison with the 
advanced countries, a little-used way of protecting research results (OECD, 2003), there 
has been a significant increase in recent years, similar to that in other European 
countries (van Pottelsberghe, 2007). In each of the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 the 
number of university applications for national patents was close to 200 per year while in 
2000 there were only around 130 applications. Although some universities are 
especially active, patenting is not restricted to a specific group of universities. Between 
2002 and 2004, all 47 public universities applied for at least one patent in one year or 
another. The differences between universities in patenting are substantial and the 
distribution is considerably skewed. While some universities, such as the Polytechnic 
University of Valencia and the Polytechnic University of Catalonia, have applied for 
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more than 20 patents each year, a significant number of universities, especially the 
small or new ones, have applied for only one or two patents in these years. 
 
The number of university patents is expected to depend on the resources devoted to 
R&D activities. Therefore expenditures on R&D have been used in the majority of 
applied studies of the determinants of academic patents (Coupé, 2003; Payne and Siow, 
2003; Azagra et al., 2006; Acosta et al., 2008). In particular, Coupé (2003) examines the 
relation between expenditure on R&D and academic patents in detail and confirms that 
it is a significant variable.  
 
In Spain, the annual statistics on R&D of the National Statistic Institute of Spain (INE) 
present information on R&D activities in the different sectors, including universities. 
This information is also presented in the OECD Statistics on R&D. Nevertheless, in 
order to safeguard confidentiality, the INE does not provide individual information. An 
alternative source that has been used in this analysis is new statistics on university 
budgets (CRUE, 2004) that provide very useful information for the analysis of R&D 
activities in the universities. Specifically, these statistics give information on the 
incomes received by the universities in the year 2002 for carrying out research and 
distinguish between basic and applied research. To use the year 2002 for R&D 
expenditures and the data from 2002, 2003 and 2004 for the dependent variable limits 
the existence of a potential endogeneity problem.  
 
The distinction between basic and applied research in these statistics (CRUE, 2004) is 
not the usual one when following the recommendations of Frascati manual and depends 
on the type of financing. In the case of basic research, the financing comes from 
subsidies and grants for carrying out research projects, mainly after competitive calls by 
the public administrations at different levels, either European, national or regional. 
According to these statistics, 94% of the funds for basic research come from public 
institutions. The applied funds come from contracts with third-party institutions for the 
provision of research and consulting services. In this case, nearly 60% of the funds are 
from the private sector. Therefore, this distinction allows the analysis not only of 
whether the universities that receive more funds for research, but also whether those that 
receive more financing, under contract, and that are more commercially oriented, have a 
greater propensity to patent. This is an important distinction because as Henderson et al. 
(1998) point out one of the main factors that explain growth in the number of university 
patent applications is the increase in industry funding of university research, although 
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the results of the empirical analysis are not conclusive (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Azagra 
et al., 2006).  
 
The increase in organised university technology offices has also been, according to 
Henderson et al. (1998), one of the explaining factors of the growth in academic patents. 
This affirmation is supported by the empirical evidence (Foltz et al., 2000; Coupé, 
2003). All the public universities in Spain have a technology transfer office (TTO) 
created with the support of the technology policy at the end of the 1980s. These TTO 
are organised in the OTRI (Offices for the Transfer of Research Results) network of 
universities. The TTOs, the mission of which is to promote relationships between the 
university and firms in the area of R&D, have undergone very significant growth in the 
last few years, reaching a total budget of €339 million in 2005, compared to €207 
million in 2000 (CYD Foundation 2007). This sum corresponds to R&D contracts 
between firms and universities managed by the TTOs. The Spanish TTOs are of quite 
different sizes and most of them have less than three technicians, mainly devoted to the 
management of contracts. In the last few years, some TTOs seem to have begun to play 
a more active role in other and more advanced ways of transferring technology, such as 
the creation of spin-offs and licensing patents (CYD Foundation 2007).  
 
To examine the influence of the TTOs on the number of university patents, their size as 
measured by the total number of employees and by the number of technicians has been 
included in the model as in Lach and Shankerman (2008). It should be pointed out that 
this is a proxy not exempt from limitations due to the fact that it does not capture all the 
factors related to the ability and effectiveness of the TTOs to transfer technology. The 
information has been provided by the TTO network of universities, which has carried 
out a survey every year since 2002 to gather information on the activities of the TTOs. 
Nevertheless, for the first years the information is not absolutely complete and therefore 
the year chosen was 2004.  
 
Academic patenting is expected to be related to the scientific quality of university 
research. However the results of the empirical analyses are not conclusive. While 
Miyata (2000) and Azagra et al., (2006) find a positive relation between scientific 
quality and inventions and patents as dependent variables respectively, the parameter is 
not significant in explaining license incomes (Lach and Shankerman, 2008). To analyse 
this relation, the number of staff with a doctorate in each university, based on 
information from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), has been included as an 
indicator of scientific quality. 
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Recent analyses of academic patents have emphasized that one of the main factors 
contributing towards their rapid rise in recent years has been the growing technological 
opportunities in the fields of biomedical and pharmaceutical research (Mowery and 
Ziedonis, 2002; Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Rafferty, 2008). To capture research 
orientation, we use the number of publications in international journals per university in 
the Science Citation Index for the period 1996-2001. Other types of publication, such as 
those in social sciences, are excluded, as the purpose is to control for differences in 
research orientation that may affect the number of patents. Comparisons between the 
scientific fields of the publications and the technological fields of applications for 
patents in the period 1996-2001 show a high degree of similarity. The percentages of 
publications and patents belonging to bio-medical sciences and chemistry are 54% and 
57% respectively of the totals for publications and patents in these areas (CYD 
Foundation, 2005). Using the previous period of years of applications for patents avoids 
a potential endogenous problem arising. Publications and patents seem to have some 
degree of complementarity and recent analyses point out that a high scientific 
performance in terms of publications increases the probability of applying for a patent 
(Azoulay et al., 2007; Breschi et al., 2007; Van Pottelsberghe, 2007).  
 
The last variable is a measure of the researchers’ incentives to patent. As has been 
explained above, both the university and the specific researcher in Spain are offered 
incentives to patent the results of their research. The Spanish Law of Patents (Law 
11/1986 of Patents of Inventions and Utility Models), in Article 20, states that “the 
university possesses the ownership of the inventions made by university staff as a 
consequence of their research function in the university”. Also, the same article states 
than “staff will have, in any case, the right to participate in the benefits obtained by the 
University for the licensing or cession of their rights over the inventions”. Although 
regions develop their own innovation and university policy, the regulations on patents 
are the same for the whole country. 
 
The universities have established internal rules for distributing possible royalties. These 
rules are freely decided by each university and have to be approved by their 
management bodies. These regulations were collected through a search in the web pages 
of universities and contacts with TTO managers. In these regulations, the percentages 
for the distribution of possible profits between the university and the researcher, and 
when applicable the department or research group to which the researcher belongs as 
well, are permanently established and to vary the royalty shares a change in the 
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regulations is required. In general terms, the greater part of the profits accrues to the 
researcher, an average of 56% for the 47 universities of the database, while the 
university itself obtains 29.5%. The rest is allocated to the department to which the 
researcher belongs (13.5%), while the share of the research group is marginal (1%), and 
in only three universities is it envisaged that these have a share in the profits. The 
compilation of this information shows that there are significant differences in the 
royalties assigned to researchers in Spanish universities. While universities such as 
Cantabria, Extremadura, Salamanca or Valladolid assign 80-90% of the profits to the 
university researcher, in other universities such as the Autonomous University of 
Barcelona, La Laguna, Girona or Jaume I de Castellón, this percentage is situated at 
lower levels of around 35%. This cross-university substantial variation allows an 
analysis to be made of whether incentives to researchers play a role in explaining 
differences in university patenting. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
3. APPLIED ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
The estimations have been carried out taking into account the nature of the endogenous 
variable, the number of patents, which constitutes a typical example of count data. In 
this case, a specification like that of count data models is preferable to a linear 
regression model estimated by ordinary least squares (Hausman et al., 1984; Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998). The basic model for count data is the Poisson model, where it is 
assumed that the endogenous variable (PATi) follows the Poisson distribution: 
 
 
    iiiiiXi
i
PAT
i
i
XPATVARXPATEe
PAT
ePATP
i
ii







'
!       (3) 
 
where Xi is a kx1 vector that collects the set of independent variables used in the model 
to explain the number of patents. In the Poisson model, the mean and variance of the 
random variable are assumed to be equal, which is a very restrictive assumption. 
Overdispersion occurs when the conditional variance  ii XPATVAR  exceeds the 
conditional mean  ii XPATE .  
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A common alternative to the Poisson model that allows for overdispersion is the 
negative binomial model. In this model an additional overdispersion parameter   is 
added, specifically we have used the model denominated NB2 by Cameron and Trevedi 
(1998). For this model, the endogenous variable PATi has variance    iiiPATVar   1 . Apart from the overdispersion test proposed by Cameron and 
Trivedi (1990), a Likelihood Ratio test is implemented in the Stata package to test the 
null 0 , (see Gutierrez et al., 2001 for details). 
 
Table 1 presents the basic statistics of the 43 universities considered in the data base 
used for the estimations. Finally, 4 of the initial 47 universities were excluded due to the 
absence of information on one or more of the relevant variables of the model. The 
endogenous variable PAT does not have zero values; hence we have have not been 
concerned with the possibility of having zero-inflated problems in the model. The 
calculus of the sample variance of the endogenous variable shows that it is greater than 
twice the sample mean and then it will be very likely that the data will be overdispersed 
after conditioning. 
 
The results for the Poisson and the negative binomial model are presented in Tables 2 
and 3. The empirical specification is similar to the ones used by Lach and Shankerman 
(2003, 2008) to estimate university license incomes and disclosures in the United States, 
which allows the results to be compared. Nevertheless, we tried other specifications 
with similar results to those presented in Tables 2 and 3. European patents were also 
used as an alternative to national patents with the same results. The estimations have 
been carried out for total university R&D income and splitting this variable between 
funding for basic and applied R&D. To control for the size differentials of the 
universities, the average numbers of faculty for the years 2002 and 2003 have also been 
included. The tests confirm the existence of overdispersion and the convenience of 
using the negative binomial models. 
 
Tables 2 and 3. Results of estimations 
 
The results of the estimations show that the share researchers have in the royalties does 
not have a positive effect on the number of university-owned patents. This result differs 
from the estimations of Lach and Shankerman (2008) that find that royalty shares have a 
positive effect on license revenues for US universities. Nevertheless, as Lach and 
Shankerman (2008) also emphasised for their results, further work is needed to establish 
or refute this link with greater confidence. Although we have tried to control for the 
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university characteristics, including most of the variables used in empirical analyses, 
that may affect the level of academic patenting some unobserved heterogeneity may 
remain related to specific historical and institutional features influencing patenting 
behaviour. To achieve more definite results would require long time series although it 
should be pointed out that because royalty shares are not expected to vary over time 
panel data estimation methods would not be very useful, as also Lach and Shankerman 
(2008) point out. Even with these cautions, the estimated parameter is not significant in 
any of the estimations carried out.  
 
These results show that the effects of incentives may be quite different depending on the 
institutional framework and the individual university characteristics, as some reviews of 
the literature also suggest (Baldini, 2006). Despite the improvement of recent years, the 
effort of Spanish universities in R&D (0.33% of the GDP) is lower than the 0.39% of 
the OECD countries (OECD, 2008). Furthermore, in the early 1990s a very considerable 
expansion of the Spanish universities took place with the creation of new universities 
(Barrio-Castro and García-Quevedo, 2005). Although this may have favoured the 
relationship between universities and firms from a territorial point of view, the research 
capacity and the scientific level of a considerable number of universities in patentable 
fields is low. The analyses (CYD Foundation, 2006) of the different methods of 
technology transfer between universities and firms also show that Spanish universities 
have a demand pull behaviour and respond, in comparison with other European 
countries, quite well to the specific demands of firms while technology push, such as the 
creation or spin-offs or the licensing of patents, are less developed. This fact is 
connected with a low level of quality and originality in research in most universities but 
also with the limited absorptive capacity of firms. Finally, the Spanish university system 
is characterised, in comparison with the United States, by the very low mobility of 
faculty members, and therefore it is difficult to expect that the royalty formula would 
have some effect on the attraction of researchers by specific universities.  
 
For the rest of the variables, the results show, as expected, a positive relation between 
the funding of R&D and the number of patents, as in other empirical analyses (Coupé, 
2003; Payne and Siow, 2003; Azagra et al., 2006; Acosta et al., 2008). The results of the 
estimations show the convenience of splitting the funded R&D between the two sources 
of funding, income for basic research and contractual funding for applied research. 
While the first of these is not significant, the parameter for contractual funding is 
positive and highly significant. 
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This result supports the statement of Henderson et al. (1998) who suggest that the 
increase in industry funding of university research is one of the factors explaining the 
increase in academic patents. Nevertheless, the literature does not absolutely agree on 
this and some empirical analyses claim that funding in general is what matters rather 
than industrial funding specifically (Foltz et al., 2000; Azagra et al., 2006; Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006). The main reason for supporting this statement is that university patents 
are more related to long term research and scientific discoveries than with the outcomes 
of contracts with firms (Azagra et al., 2003). Nevertheless as has been mentioned above, 
in Spanish universities knowledge transfer is more demand pull than technology push. 
In this sense, as Stephan et al. (2007) point out, faculty interaction with industry can 
lead to new ideas and to an increased interest in patenting. This is not only because 
industry often has a patent focus but also because industry directs its research towards 
matters that are well suited to eventual patenting. The interviews carried out with some 
TTO managers, particularly in the polytechnic universities, lead to the same conclusion 
They point out that university-industry relationships, in many cases with the support of 
public policy, have fostered new university-owned patents.  
 
Henderson et al. (1998) also claim that an increase in the organised university 
technology offices has positive effects on academic patenting activity, a statement that 
is supported by some empirical evidence for the US (Coupé, 2003). Lach and 
Shankerman (2008) also found a positive effect of  TTOs, measured by their size, on 
license incomes but only for private universities and not for public ones. In the 
estimations, the results for the effect of TTOs on patents are not significant, whether 
using the total number of employees or the number of technicians. Although the proxy 
used has some limitations, the results are coherent with the average situation and 
performance of Spanish TTOs. As the new Spanish R&D Plan 2008-2011 (FECYT, 
2007) states, the TTOs are overloaded with work and much focused on administrative 
functions when they should behave as strategic bodies. It should be pointed out that the 
effects of the estimations are average effects and some evidence exists for specific 
TTOs of a positive effect on academic patents (Azagra et al., 2003).  
 
Finally, none of the rest of the variables used to control for differences in university 
characteristics, particularly in quality and orientation of research, are significant. As has 
been pointed out above, the results of the empirical literature are not conclusive and our 
results coincide with these obtained by Lach and Shankerman (2008) that do not find a 
positive relation between the quality of research, measured by the number of citations, 
and research orientation and license incomes. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As Jaffe et al. (2007) point out patents are playing a growing role in the conduct of 
academic science and in the translation of academic research into industrial innovation 
and the rules governing university licensing is an important research agenda in progress. 
This paper has focused on the analysis of the determinants of academic patents and 
specifically on the effects of incentives to researchers on applications for university-
owned patents. The empirical results show that the influence of royalty shares to 
university scientists on academic patents is not significant and that other university 
characteristics explain the distribution of patents in Spanish universities. Therefore, the 
results show that the effects of incentives may vary considerably depending on the 
institutional framework and the specific characteristics of the universities. 
 
Another relevant result of the empirical analysis is that R&D funding is a relevant 
variable, particularly contractual R&D funding. This result is coherent with the 
affirmation of Henderson et al. (1998) who point out that the increase in industry 
funding of university research is one of the factors explaining the increase in academic 
patents. Both results show, as do some reports on the Spanish university system, that the 
behaviour of Spanish universities is more demand pull than technology push and that 
the university-industry interaction tends to direct the research towards solutions that are 
well suited to patenting. Finally, the results also support the view that in Spain the 
technological transfer offices are still playing a limited role in the more advanced ways 
of transferring knowledge from academic research to firms. 
 
The results are not without limitations. Firstly income from licenses is a better indicator 
to use to analyse the effects of incentives to researchers. However, this information is 
incomplete and scarce for Spanish universities. Nevertheless, patents have been 
extensively used as an indicator of knowledge output and they are a first step on the way 
to obtaining licence incomes. Secondly, this analysis concentrates on the characteristics 
of the universities that determine their propensity to patent, although recent studies have 
also shown that the individual characteristics of the researchers influence patent 
applications (Azoulay et al., 2007; Stephan et al., 2007). Finally, further work with 
richer data is needed, as Lach and Shankerman (2008) also recognize, in order to 
analyse with absolute confidence whether or not there is a link between royalty shares 
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and academic patents production and to know in detail how royalties affect the 
behaviour of scientists and in consequence the rate of discoveries patented.  
 
The results have some implications for innovation policy. Firstly, it is convenient to 
improve the utilisation of the existing infrastructure of intermediaries, as a recent 
diagnosis of Spanish technology policy stated (OECD, 2007). In particular to improve 
the low technological level of the Spanish economy it is necessary to reinforce the 
relationships between universities and firms. To achieve this goal, TTOs should play a 
more strategic role and not, as currently happens, be mainly focused on administrative 
tasks. This strategic role should be addressed not only to increasing the ability to patent 
but also to increasing the quality and internationalisation of the university patents and 
their possibilities of being licensed. Secondly, if policy has the objective of increasing 
the level of academic patenting in the belief that this will foster the rate of technology 
transfer it is necessary to devote more funds to research, to increase its quality and to 
improve the absorptive capacity of firms. Finally, the results on the effects of incentives 
and royalty shares on academic patents provide some information about how to design 
intellectual property rights in academic institutions. The results show, in comparison 
with the United States, that in less developed countries other characteristics of the 
institutional framework and the university system seem more important than incentives 
for academic patenting. Nevertheless, as the increasing debate (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; 
van Pottelsberghe, 2006; Jaffe at al., 2007) on this subject shows the role that patents 
play in academic science and finally in productivity and growth is a complex one. 
Further research that goes beyond the scope of this paper is needed in order to acquire 
accurate information on the different effects that should be taken into account in the 
design of innovation policy related with academic patents.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PAT 13.90 15.02 1 68 
R&D 1.54e+07 1.28e+07 755438.3 5.17e+07 
R&DB 1.07e+07 8641161 353048.8 3.66e+07 
R&DA 4707286 5147647 402389.4 2.39e+07 
TTOPER 12.65 10.28 1 43 
TTOTEC 7.68 5.38 1 28.5 
FACULTY 1628.51 1054.64 370 5102 
PHD 1124.53 848.44 228 4297 
PUBFAC 0.929 0.447 0.288 2.131 
SHRES 56.70 13.63 33.0 90.0 
SHUNIV 29.15 12.13 10.0 67.0 
PAT: Total number of university-owned patents for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 
R&D: Total university incomes for R&D (in euro). 2002  
R&DB: University incomes for basic R&D (in euro). 2002 
R&DA: University incomes for applied R&D (in euro). 2002 
TTOPER: Number of TTO employees. 2004 
TTOTEC: Number of TTO technicians. 2004 
FACULTY: Total number of university faculty. Average 2002 and 2003 
PHD: University staff with a Doctorate. 2002 
PUBFAC: Number of publications in the Science Citation Index (1996-2001) per 
faculty 
SHRES: Inventor’s royalty share (in %) 
SHUNIV: University’s royalty share (in %) 
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Table 2. Results of the estimations. Poisson model 
 
jˆ  jz ˆ  p-value. jˆ  j
z ˆ  p-
value 
Ln (R&D/FACULTY)  0.781** 6.52 0.000   
Ln (R&DB/FACULTY)  0.340** 3.16 0.002
Ln R&DA/FACULTY) 0.419** 5.74 0.000
Ln (PHD/FACULTY) 0.527 1.36 0.173 0.551 1.42 0.155
Ln 
(TTOPER/FACULTY)  
0.010 0.12 0.902 0.006 0.07 0.943
PUBFAC -0.236* -2.01 0.044 -0.143 -1.18 0.239
Ln FACULTY  1.037** 11.62 0.000 0.967** 10.80 0.000
SHRES -0.187 -0.50 0.615 -0.204 -0.55 0.583
Intercept -11.560** -8.94 0.000 -10.261** -8.49 0.000
Log likelihood -213.44 -206.52  
LR 307.26 0.000 321.11  0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.418 0.437  
LR: Likelihood test ratio to test the null that all the parameters associated to the regressors are equal to 
zero 
**, *, significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results of the estimations. Negative binomial model 
 
jˆ  jz ˆ  p-value. jˆ  jz ˆ  p-value
Ln (R&D/FACULTY)  0.586* 1.99 0.046   
Ln (R&DB/FACULTY)  0.103 0.37 0.713
Ln R&DA/FACULTY) 0.452** 2.65 0.008
Ln (PHD/FACULTY) 0.308 0.29 0.770 0.502 0.49 0.624
Ln (TTOPER/FACULTY)  -0.051 -0.28 0.779 -0.021 -
0.12 
0.904
PUBFAC -0.029 -0.08 0.939 0.081 0.22 0.827
Ln FACULTY  0.960** 4.43 0.000 0.942** 4.49 0.000
SHRES 0.004 0.00 0.997 -0.102 -
0.10 
0.917
Intercept -9.936** -3.14 0.002 -8.708** -
2.94 
0.003
Log likelihood -142.71 -140.80  
LR  = 0 141.46 0.000 131.44  0.000
LR 29.83 0.000 33.66  0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.095 0.107  
LR: Likelihood test ratio to test the null that all the parameters associated to the regressors are equal to 
zero 
  parameter associated to over-dispersion in the negative binomial model    iiiPATVar   1 . 
LR 0 , likelihood ratio test to test the null of 0 . 
**, *, significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
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